

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 12644

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O.11652:YGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: UK STATEMENT MADE AT
PLENARY AUGUST 18, 1978

CTB MESSAGE NO.310

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UK STATEMENT MADE BY EDMONDS
AT PLENARY ON AUGUST 18.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. THIS PLENARY MEETING MARKS A BREAK IN THE LONGEST
ROUND OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR. IT HAS NOT ONLY
BEEN THE LONGEST ROUND BUT ALSO, IN MY VIEW, THE MOST
PRODUCTIVE. TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON A
NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN THE TREATY AND THE SEP-
ARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT, AND MUCH OF IT HAS BEEN
RECORDED IN AGREED TREATY LANGUAGE. AT THE SAME TIME,
OUR INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS HAVE ENABLED THE 3 DELEGATIONS

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TO UNDERSTAND MORE CLEARLY THE OUTSTANDING POINTS OF
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US. I THEREFORE PROPOSE TO REVIEW
BRIEFLY TODAY OUR MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS AND THE REMAINING
PROBLEMS.

2. AT OUR MEETING ON 10 AUGUST, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
WORKING GROUPS REPORTED ON THEIR RESPECTIVE ACTIVITIES.

THE GREATEST PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE WITH THE MULTILATERAL TREATY. THE POLITICAL WORKING GROUP HAS ACHIEVED A COMPOSITE DRAFT TEXT OF ALL THE OPERATIVE ARTICLES AND THE ANNEX OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. THIS TEXT INCLUDES AGREED LANGUAGE FOR SEVERAL ARTICLES, MOST NOTABLY ARTICLE I, WHICH DEFINES THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE TREATY. MOREOVER, ON 14 AUGUST THE POLITICAL WORKING GROUP PRODUCED AN AGREED TEXT FOR THE PROTOCOL ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. FOR THOSE OF US WHO RECALL OUR EARLIER DISCUSSIONS ON THIS APPARENTLY INTRACTABLE SUBJECT, THIS IS A GRATIFYING ACHIEVEMENT. I BELIEVE THAT IT SHOWS THAT, GIVEN GOOD WILL AND A SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS CAN BE FOUND TO THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS.

3. HOWEVER, AGREEMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN REACHED ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT PROVISIONS IN THE MULTILATERAL TREATY. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CONCERN THE DURATION OF THE TREATY AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE. WE ARE ALL AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THESE ISSUES SO THAT WE CAN COMPLETE WORK ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE TREATY AND SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT. I HOPE THAT, WHEN WE RETURN IN SEPTEMBER, WE CAN SOON REACH AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONS FOR THE DURATION OF THE TREATY AND THE REVIEW, WHICH WILL NOT ONLY BE ACCEPTABLE TO OUR 3 GOVERNMENTS, BUT WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO ATTRACTING THE WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY.

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IBLE INTERNATIONAL ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY.

4. DESPITE THE PARTICULARLY HARD WORK OF OUR TECHNICAL EXPERTS IN THIS ROUND, PROGRESS ON THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT HAS BEEN LESS CONSPICUOUS THAN ON THE MULTILATERAL TREATY. HOWEVER, THE COMPOSITE TEXTS PREPARED FOR SEVERAL PARTS OF THE AGREEMENT AND ITS TECHNICAL ANNEX RECORD MANY AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND HELP US TO IDENTIFY THE MAJOR ISSUES OF DIFFERENCE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I SHOULD LIKE ONCE MORE TO STRESS THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE TREATY WILL DEPEND ON THE CONFIDENCE WHICH OUR 3 GOVERNMENTS HAVE IN ITS VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL WISH TO BE SURE THAT IT CAN ADEQUATELY VERIFY THAT OTHER PARTIES ARE COMPLYING WITH THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH IT IS BEING ASKED TO ASSUME. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL WISH TO KNOW HOW GOOD THE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS ARE. IT WILL NOT BE ENOUGH FOR MY DELEGATION TO SAY THAT WE DO NOT KNOW AND THAT ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOTH NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS AND ON-SITE INSPECTION HAVE BEEN LEFT FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

5. WE AGREE WITH OUR SOVIET PARTNERS THAT OUR TASK IS TO PREPARE AN ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL DOCUMENT; BUT WE SEE NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE POLITICAL NATURE OF A DOCUMENT AND THE INCLUSION OF A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF TECHNICAL DETAIL. THE PROTOCOL TO THE 1976 TREATY ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THIS. INDEED, IF THE LEVEL OF TECHNICAL DETAIL IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ENHANCE OUR CONFIDENCE IN TREATY COMPLIANCE, IT WILL MAKE THE DOCUMENT SIGNIFICANTLY LESS ACCEPTABLE POLITICALLY.

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6. THE REPORTS OF COLONEL TARASOV AND MR. HECKROTTE ON 10 AUGUST DESCRIBED OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. I SHOULD LIKE TO DRAW ATTENTION TO SOME OF THESE:

FIRST, THE NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS OF NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS.

SECOND, THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THESE STATIONS AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF DATA.

THIRD, THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT A REQUEST FOR AN ON-SITE INSPECTION.

FOURTH, THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE HOST PARTY IN THE CONDUCT OF AN ON-SITE INSPECTION.

MY DELEGATION HAS SET OUT ITS VIEWS ON HOW BEST TO RE-SOLVE THESE ISSUES SO AS TO ENSURE THE MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS AND ON-SITE
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INSPECTION, WITH PROPER REGARD FOR THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF STATES PARTIES.

7. OUR PARTNERS WILL RECALL THAT ON 18 MAY I PRESENTED PROPOSALS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM'S PARTICIPATION IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. I SAID THAT OUR PROPOSALS WERE DESIGNED NOT TO MAKE ANY MORE DIFFICULT THE NEGOTIATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND ITS SUBSEQUENT IMPLEMENTATION, AND NOT TO DISTURB THE BALANCE OF ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. I SPECIFICALLY PROPOSED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM SHOULD SIGN THE AGREEMENT, BE A MEMBER OF THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, AND IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS FOR NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS AND ON-SITE INSPECTION IN THE SOVIET UNION ONLY IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES.

8. WE UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S PREFERENCE TO DELAY DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S ROLE IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT UNTIL WE ALL HAVE A MORE COMPLETE PICTURE OF THE CONTENTS OF THAT AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, FROM TIME TO TIME THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS REFERRED TO UNITED KINGDOM PARTICIPATION, IN DISCUSSION OF PARTICULAR PARTS OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. IT HAS NOT BEEN CLEAR TO US TO WHAT EXTENT THESE COMMENTS REFLECTED THE GENERAL SOVIET VIEW OF OUR PROPOSALS. MY DELEGATION WOULD THEREFORE FIND IT HELPFUL IF, WHEN WE RESUME IN SEPTEMBER, THE SOVIET DELEGATION CAN PROVIDE US WITH AN EXPLANATION OF ITS OVERALL REACTIONS TO OUR PROPOSALS.

9. IN THIS STATEMENT I HAVE SUMMARIZED MY DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON THE RESULTS WE HAVE ACHIEVED TOGETHER OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS. THEY ARE SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS, AND ALL
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MEMBERS OF ALL 3 DELEGATIONS ARE TO BE CONGRATULATED ON THEM. BUT I HAVE ALSO DESCRIBED THE MORE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ON WHICH AGREEMENT HAS STILL TO BE REACHED. WE ARE ALL NOW RETURNING TO OUR CAPITALS FOR A SHORT WORKING BREAK, AND I BELIEVE WE ALL KNOW THE ISSUES ON WHICH WE NEED TO WORK DURING THAT BREAK. IN THAT CONNEC-

TION, MY GOVERNMENT HAS INSTRUCTED ME TO INFORM OUR
NEGOTIATING PARTNERS THAT, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE ACQUIESCED
IN THE PROPOSAL FOR A BREAK, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD
HOPED THAT THIS SESSION WHICH STARTED ON 4 MAY WOULD BE
THE ONE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT. MY GOVERNMENT WILL BE
IMPATIENT TO RESUME ON THE DATE SET, 11 SEPTEMBER. I
HOPE THAT OUR PARTNERS SHARE THIS FEELING AND THAT THEY
WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT OUR NEXT SESSION REALLY MUST
BE THE ONE IN WHICH WE REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON A
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. END TEXT. JOHNSON

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